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In the first part of a two-part article, the author critically
evaluates the anti-terrorism provisions of Canada’s Immi-
gration Act. The impact of these provisions on refugees is
the focus of the essay, but her observations are relevant to
the situation of other categories of non-citizens as well. The
inquiry begins by considering international efforts to
address “terrorism,” the relevance of international humani-
tarian law to an assessment of acts of “terror,” and the
nature of contemporary discourse on “terrorism.” Next, the
evolution of the current admissibility provisions in Cana-
dian immigration law, with particular reference to refugee
policy and national security, is reviewed. A brief discussion
of current policy directions concludes part 1.
Résumé
Dans ce premier volet (d’un article à deux volets), l’auteure
se livre à une évaluation critique des dispositions anti-
terroristes de la loi canadienne sur l’immigration. Elle se
concentre sur l’impact de ces dispositions sur les réfugiés,
mais ses remarques sont aussi valables pour d’autres
catégories de non-citoyens. L’enquête examine, avant tout,
les efforts déployés au niveau international pour
contrecarrer « le terrorisme », la pertinence de la loi
humanitaire internationale dans le cadre de l’évaluation
des actes de « terreur », et la nature du discours
contemporain sur le « terrorisme ». Seront examinés
ensuite, la façon dont ont évolué les dispositions courantes
de la loi canadienne sur l’immigration, la notion
d’admissibilité, avec une référence particulière à la
politique sur les réfugiés et la sécurité nationale. Pour
conclure cette première partie, on trouvera une brève
discussion sur les tendances dans la politique actuelle.
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What can we make of the fact that terrorism has become
such a shifty category that yesterday’s terrorists are today’s
Nobel Peace Prize winners? . . . [W]e question the very
possibility of defining and thereby giving a satisfactory
account of, the facts categorized as terrorism . . . Far from
being a benign or gratuitous labelling exercise, the stark
issue of who has the power to define another as a terrorist
has obvious moral and political implications . . . The vari-
ous types of fictionalization—representation by the me-
dia, political manipulation, academic definitions, the im-
aginary archetype . . . find their genesis and nourishment
in the play with meaning and confusion of contexts inher-
ent in the word “terrorism.”
—J. Zulaika and W. Douglas, Terror and Taboo1
Introduction
Although numerous states and movements have usedviolence to achieve specific political goals through-out history,2 the use of the word terrorism3 has rela-
tively recent origins. The term was coined to describe a
specific phase of the French Revolution known as the Reign
of Terror, when the Jacobins initiated a campaign of re-
pression in which at least 17,000 French citizens were guil-
lotined and many thousands more imprisoned and tor-
tured.4 In this context, Mitchell indicates that “[t]errorism
was perceived as an unspeakable crime—the product of
moral depravity or madness.”5 “Terrorism” was initially de-
scribed an exercise of repression by a state against its own
citizens, but during the course of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries both the term itself and the measures
adopted by states in response to it became increasingly
politicized. One need only consider the U.S. description of
its retaliatory bombing attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan
as “counter-terrorism,” or the speeches of Israeli leaders
decrying the “terrorist” acts of Palestinians while justify-
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ing gunfire on crowds of Palestinian civilians as “defence,”
to appreciate how “terrorists” are manufactured for the
most cynical and explicitly political purposes.
Canadian officials acknowledge that Canada has never
been a major target for “terrorist” attacks.6 The govern-
ment’s preoccupation with “terrorism” has focused prima-
rily on the perceived “terrorist” threat posed by refugees
and immigrants arriving from non-Western countries. Se-
curity intelligence reports confirm the existence of indi-
viduals and organizations operating in Canada to support,
plan, and mount attacks elsewhere, although open infor-
mation by no means suggests that the participation rate of
immigrants in these activities is proportionally higher than
of people born in Canada.7 Such reports have been used to
justify a complex web of immigration security measures.
While few would dispute the legitimacy of genuine efforts
to protect public safety, the problem with many of these
measures is that they have cast an unacceptably wide and
uneven net. The “terrorist” has become the post-modern
substitute for the “vicious class” that nineteenth-century
immigration laws constructed as a tool of immigration con-
trol. In common with their historical counterpart, anti-
terrorism provisions in the Immigration Act serve as a cover
to legalize the broadest discretion over who gets in and who
is permitted to stay.
In 1991 Gorlick commented that the government used
its national security policies to exclude those considered to
harbour ideological or political views inimical to the lib-
eral democratic values of the Canadian state.8 In the post–
Cold War context with its attendant international
realignments, this observation no longer provides a full
account of immigration security policy. An analysis of cur-
rent deportation practices suggests that immigration meas-
ures aimed at protecting the “security of Canada” are not
about rooting out foes of democracy and genuine threats
to the nation. They are but one tool, in an increasingly so-
phisticated arsenal, to contain and manage refugee admis-
sions.9 In this regard, not all refugee communities are sub-
jected to the same level of security scrutiny.
As Whitaker explains in his recent discussion of the se-
curity dimension of refugee policy, the “systematic politi-
cal bias of the Cold War has been replaced by a patchwork
of specific biases.”10 He points out that the injustices against
individuals are just as frequent today, but the “biases are
more diffuse.”11 Indeed, under the new order, the designa-
tion of certain refugees as “terrorists” serves multiple geo-
political and economic interests. While I agree with
Whitaker that racism should not be seen as a sole explana-
tion for government security policy,12 current policies do
reinforce systemic racism in Canadian law and practice.12
A few examples are illustrative. On the one hand, the
government introduced expedited screening and emer-
gency evacuation for 5,000 ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo
in 1999, in spite of the reasonably high level of active sup-
port for the Kosovo Liberation Army among the refugee
population.14 On the other, there was an extremely modest
response, implemented only last year, to a humanitarian
crisis in Sierra Leone, a country that has suffered a devas-
tating war for the past decade and has produced a massive
outflow of refugees. We can also consider the inherent con-
tradiction in a government policy that permits certain
diaspora communities to raise funds in support of politi-
cal causes and organizations in their homelands with im-
punity, while others risk expulsion from Canada for the
very same conduct. In preparation for the World Confer-
ence on Racism, the Canadian Council for Refugees noted,
Certain ethnic or national groups are particularly apt to be
targeted for extra security checks . . . Those who have been
found inadmissible or have been kept waiting without a deci-
sion being made on a security related provision include sig-
nificant numbers of Iranians with some association with the
Mojahaddin movement and Kurdish people.15
In effect, the immigration/national-security apparatus
replicates an imperative of exclusion and restriction that
pre-emptively and selectively casts some groups of refu-
gees and other non-citizens as “terrorist,” “alien,” and
“other”—people on the periphery whose claims for justice
can be ignored.16
As Canadian law changes its conception of refugees from
victims and survivors to fearsome “terrorists,” political ac-
tivism that is lawful for citizens becomes a basis for expel-
ling non-citizens. The expression of support for a libera-
tion struggle being waged in one’s country of origin can be
sufficient grounds to be designated a security risk. The
Immigration Act accords the same treatment to the mas-
termind of a hijacking and the person who has raised
money in Canada to support an orphanage in her war-rav-
aged homeland. Refugee claimants seeking asylum and
Convention refugees applying for permanent residence may
be subjected to security interviews that all too frequently
resemble interrogations and for which the individuals ar-
rive unprepared, having been given no notice of the pur-
pose of the interview or their entitlement to be represented
by counsel.17 Most of the adverse information that the Ca-
nadian Security Intelligence Service (csis, or “the Service”)
collects will be classified on national security grounds and
therefore not disclosed to the person concerned. Refugee
claimants may be deemed ineligible to even initiate their
claims and be divested of the right to a “post-claim review.”
Subsequent administrative proceedings very often leave
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individuals in a legal limbo while their files await review
by department analysts. Once a “security certificate” has
been issued, the decision of a single “designated” judge is
considered conclusive proof of the allegations against the
individual and cannot be appealed. The result will be man-
datory detention, followed ultimately by deportation back
to the country where the refugee may be at serious risk of
persecution, torture, or death. While the numbers of af-
fected individuals are relatively small, the gravity of the is-
sues at stake signal an urgent need for law reform.18
The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a
critical lens through which the anti-terrorism provisions
of Canada’s Immigration Act can be evaluated. The im-
pact of these provisions on refugees is the primary focus of
this essay, but my observations are relevant to the situation
of other categories of non-citizens as well. My inquiry will
begin by considering international efforts to address “ter-
rorism,” the relevance of international humanitarian law
to an assessment of acts of “terror,” and the nature of con-
temporary discourse on “terrorism.” Next, the evolution
of the current admissibility provisions in Canadian immi-
gration law, with particular reference to refugee policy and
national security, will be reviewed. A brief discussion of
current policy directions will conclude part 1. In part 2, an
analysis of the Federal Court’s key decisions dealing with
immigration security and refugee exclusion will be exam-
ined, highlighting the Court’s role in manufacturing and
instrumentalizing “terrorists.” Before concluding, some pre-
liminary suggestions for navigating the contested repre-
sentations of “terrorism” will be offered, with a view to re-
storing human rights for refugees while safeguarding a
genuine public interest in security.
“Terrorism”: International Initiatives and
Contemporary Discourse
The first international initiative aimed at combating “ter-
rorism” was undertaken in 1937 by the League of Nations.
The proposed Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Terrorism defined “terrorism” as “criminal acts di-
rected against a State and intended or calculated to create a
state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group
of persons or the general public.” Only one nation, India,
ratified the Convention before the outbreak of the Second
World War and the demise of the League of Nations.19 In
the post–1945 era, the threat of “terrorism” gained increas-
ing prominence on the agendas of the United Nations, and
a number of Western states in particular. Between 1968 and
1972, a series of high-profile hijacking incidents against Is-
raeli and Jordanian aircraft, together with the Munich Olym-
pics attack by the Black September Organization, coalesced
international concern.20 At the same time, however, recog-
nition of the legitimacy of anti-colonial (and sometimes
violent) struggles against oppressive regimes (e.g., South
Africa, Mozambique, and Palestine) was becoming increas-
ingly important throughout the Third World. Through a
series of resolutions adopted during the first decades of
the United Nations, the abstract principle of self-determi-
nation as initially articulated in the un Charter had been
upgraded to an invocable right of peoples.21 Schrijver de-
scribes how this development culminated in the Decolon-
isation Declaration of 1960, in the identical Article 1 of the
International Covenants of Human Rights of 1966, pro-
viding that “All peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion,” and in the firm recognition accorded to self-deter-
mination in the 1970 Declaration of Principles of Interna-
tional Law Governing Friendly Relations among States.22
In this context, any effort to define “terrorism” was fraught
with difficulty. As noted by Higgins, “[i]f the West was nerv-
ous that a definition of terrorism could be used to include
‘state terrorism’, the third world was nervous that any defi-
nition which emphasized non-State actors would fail to
differentiate between terrorism properly so called, and the
struggle for national liberation.”23 When the draft Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Terrorism, sponsored by the
United States, was introduced at the United Nations in 1972,
a bitter debate ensued between First World and Third World
nations on the merits of a categorical ban on the use of
violence. The draft Convention was rejected.24 In the inter-
vening years, the United Nations has attempted to achieve
a fine balance between these competing concerns, through
a series of strongly worded resolutions condemning “all acts,
methods and practices of terrorism”25 on the one hand, and
on the other, by promulgating treaties that deliberately
avoid umbrella definitions in favour of proscribing spe-
cific and defined criminal misconduct. Developments in
international humanitarian law, discussed below, represent
a parallel response to the question of national liberation
wars.
To date, the United Nations has developed eleven sepa-
rate agreements prohibiting, among other things, aircraft
hijacking, aircraft sabotage, attacks against ships and fixed
platforms in the ocean, attacks at airports, violence against
officials and diplomats, hostage-taking, the use of un-
marked plastic explosives, terrorist bombings (excluding,
in certain cases, activities committed within a single state)
and, most recently, the financing of terrorist offences.26
Regional bodies have adopted similar agreements.27 The
essential goal of the treaties is to elevate the specified of-
fences to the status of “international crimes,” ensuring pros-
ecution of the accused by imposing upon signatory states
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the alternative obligation to extradite or submit the accused
for prosecution to the appropriate national authority. The
new International Criminal Court (icc), a separate but
complementary initiative, will have jurisdiction over in-
ternational crimes including genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and aggression—whether committed
by states or insurgent groups. However, the Rome Statute
does not identify “terrorism” among the distinct catego-
ries of crimes within the court’s jurisdiction.28 With the
exception of the crime of aggression, which remains unde-
fined, pending adoption of an agreed definition, the treaty
defines each of the crimes with specific reference to illegal
acts.29 It deserves mention that the Rome Statute includes
detailed provisions for individual and “superior” criminal
responsibility. In this regard, mere membership in an or-
ganization—in the absence of a nexus to the commission
of an offence, or in the case of superior officers, in the ab-
sence of personal command responsibility for their subor-
dinates who committed an offence—is not a crime under
the Rome Statute.30
The inability of states to arrive at a common consensus
on the meaning of the term terrorism has not prevented
international bodies from condemning it, nor has it pre-
vented states from criminalizing specific acts. The 1996 g8
Ministerial Conference on Terrorism adopted a series of
measures that made no attempt to define terrorism.31 In-
stead the agreed text aimed at facilitating extradition ar-
rangements and clamping down on criminal use of the
Internet and “camouflage” charities involved in illicit
transborder fundraising.32 Before the meeting, President
Clinton identified terrorism as
[t]he greatest security challenge of the twenty-first century . . .
We cannot have economic security in a global economy un-
less we can stand against those forces of terrorism. The U.S.
will lead the way and we expect our allies to walk with us hand
in hand.33
In more concrete terms, Canada’s Criminal Code iden-
tifies discrete offences involving aircraft, international mari-
time navigation, internationally protected persons, nuclear
material, and hostage taking, as well as war crimes and
crimes against humanity, all of which may be subject to
Canadian prosecution, regardless of where the offence was
committed.34 The newly implemented Crimes against Hu-
manity Act ensures that refugees who have committed such
crimes may be subject to domestic prosecution.35 On the
other hand, membership in an organization has not been a
crime in Canada since the imposition of the War Measures
Act against the Front de libération du Québec during the
October crisis thirty years ago.36 A minority of countries,
including Italy, Portugal, and Turkey, have enacted legisla-
tion making it a crime for citizens and non-citizens alike
to belong to a “terrorist” organization, to provide support
or recruit for a “terrorist” organization. It is noteworthy
that the Italian Court of Appeal sustained convictions for
the Palestinians accused of hijacking the Italian cruise ship
Achille Lauro in 1985 but found that only the small, armed
nucleus of the Palestine Liberation Front that conceived
and carried out the hijacking was an “armed band” (“in-
ternational terrorist organization”) within the meaning of
Italy’s penal code. Neither the Palestine Liberation Front
nor the Palestine Liberation Organization as a whole could
be considered criminal organizations, because their essen-
tial objective was the liberation of Palestine.37 Domestic laws
in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
identify “terrorism” itself as a crime but include a precise
definition of the term for the purpose of applying the law.
The majority of countries responding to a Counsel of Eu-
rope survey in 1991 indicated that they had no special anti-
terrorism legislation.38
While the academic literature on “terrorism” includes a
proliferation of definitions, the consensus among many
authors is that there is no universally or even generally ac-
cepted definition.39 Schmid reports that 109 different defi-
nitions of the term international terrorism were advanced
between 1936 and 1981,40 and more have appeared since.41
Although there seems to be agreement that “terrorism” in-
volves the threat or use of violence, Lambert indicates that
differences in definition range from the semantic to the
conceptual.42 The term has been used as a synonym for “re-
bellion, street battles, civil strife, insurrection, rural guer-
rilla war, coups d’état and a dozen other things,” with the
result that it has “become almost meaningless, covering
almost any, and not necessarily political, act of violence.”43
Levitt suggests that the effort to formulate a widely accept-
able definition is akin to the search for the Holy Grail.”44
Commenting on the initiatives undertaken by the United
Nations over the years, Higgins emphasizes that “[t]errorism
is a term without legal significance . . . it is at once a short-
hand to allude to a variety of problems with some com-
mon elements, and a method of indicating community
condemnation for the conduct concerned.”45 Comment-
ing on the initial definition contained in the League of
Nations Convention, Borricand observes that this initia-
tive “has been much criticized and quite rightly so.”46 He
elaborates, “Indeed, defining terrorism by the terror it
causes is a tautology; speaking of criminal acts is remark-
ably vague, since the notion of crime varies from one State
to another; and lastly, classing as terrorism only those acts
that are directed at a State . . . is a very restrictive idea . . . ”47
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In the face of this definitional quagmire, the use of “ter-
rorist” as a conceptual category in the absence of any quali-
fication of constituent elements, must be seen for what it
is: a highly charged political position embedded in the par-
ticularity of a given cultural, social, and tactical context.48
Chomsky identifies the political filters employed to cast the
Kurds as “marxist and terrorist,” while characterizing the
Turkish state as a “secular democracy beleaguered by ter-
rorism,”49 in support of this thesis. Challenging the defini-
tions of “terrorism” exploited by the “terrorism industry”
of Western states, quasi-private institutes, and private se-
curity firms, Herman and O’Sullivan assert,
If . . . the West has been able to label the world’s rebels in
Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Central
America, and other places as “terrorists,” and the West and its
proxies as engaging in “counterterror,” this is a propaganda
achievement of historic dimensions. It is also the ultimate
Orwellian transformation: the victims are made the terror-
ists, whereas the terrorists are the alleged victims driven to a
counterterror response.50
In a similar vein, Falk underscores the extent to which
the language of “terrorism” has been enlisted in the service
of partisan causes that lie at the root of contemporary geo-
politics. When Western states criminalize popular move-
ments that have been banned by ruling elites in their coun-
tries of origin, very often the main patterns of conflict are
actually reinforced.51 Support for Falk’s analysis is found in
two recent examples. External support became a critical
component of the anc’s ultimate success in overthrowing
the apartheid regime in South Africa. On the other hand,
when the United States proscribed the Liberation Tamils
of Tamil Eelam (ltte) as a “foreign terrorist organization”
in 1997, the prospects for initiating peace talks and bring-
ing an end to the protracted war in Sri Lanka deteriorated.
It is interesting to contrast the response of a spokesperson
for the Sri Lankan foreign office, hailing the American ban
on the ltte as “a victory for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy,”
with the concern expressed by moderate critics that the U.S.
policy would thwart attempts to bring the movement into
the democratic mainstream, forcing it to become more in-
transigent.52 When Western counter-terrorism policies quell
all prospects for external dissent, fundraising, and mobiliza-
tion, legitimate liberation struggles are further marginalized,
leaving even less space for non-violent, political strategies.
Returning to the question of defining “terrorism,” the ad-
age often cited that crystallizes the problem is, One per-
son’s freedom-fighter is another’s terrorist. The context of
the international debate has been limited to non-state ac-
tors. Even the most recent treaties on the suppression of
terrorist bombings and financing are directed narrowly at
activities committed against states and their populations,
but not by states. In this regard, Chadwick notes that the
language used in efforts toward anti-terrorist codification
is a manifestation of ideological solidarity on the part of
some Western states. She asserts,
States have yet to target themselves for codified sanction for
acts of terrorism, whether such acts are state-sponsored, state-
supported, or state-conducted. This omission is particularly
egregious when viewed in the light of the many state mecha-
nisms of public control which may work to provoke societal
violence. This disregard of at least one-half of the equation
required to solve the problem of political violence makes it
highly possible that state-centric solutions arrived at are in
error in both approach and effect.53
For Chadwick the problem isn’t the intrinsic nature of
the term terrorism, but rather the offence-specific and piece-
meal nature of the un treaties. While acknowledging the
conceptual and definitional pitfalls, she advocates a more
even-handed working definition of “terrorist offence,”
which stipulates that “the instigators of terrorist violence
can be an individual, a group, or a government.”54
The crucial difference between Chadwick and the pri-
marily Western “experts” and defenders of “terrorism” dis-
course, whom Chomsky and Falk sharply rebuke,55 is that
Chadwick focuses squarely on the need for an international
strategy that accounts for and accommodates the legal
rights and entitlements of “peoples” engaged in wars of
national liberation.56 Chadwick, in common with a broad
range of other scholars, argues that the guidance of inter-
national humanitarian law is critical in any assessment of
“terrorism,” and ultimately in any effort to deter its occur-
rence.57 When acts of “terror” and violence are committed
in an armed conflict, international humanitarian law fur-
nishes the rules of conduct for both state and non-state
actors and distinguishes between permissible and imper-
missible uses of force.58 While critical theorists continue to
interrogate the broader project of international law and its
colonial antecedents, there is much less controversy about
the pragmatic utility of using universal rules to define the
categories of permissible participants and strategies in-
volved in armed conflict. As noted by Greenwood, even
before 1899, “the requirement that certain humanitarian
principles be observed in warfare was well established in
all main cultures.”59 According to norms that many schol-
ars assert have achieved the status of customary interna-
tional law, groups that can be identified as a “people” are
entitled to use armed force to assert claims of self-
determination against a state that engages in systematic re-
pression and human rights violations. In such conditions
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an otherwise internal or civil conflict is “international-
ized.”60 Falk indicates that “there is no right to resort to
force so long as a government behaves democratically and
in fundamental accordance with the basic principles of
human rights. But, where a government is oppressive to-
ward a racial or political, ethnic minority or religious mi-
nority, or to a constituent people within its sovereignty . . .
there is an increasing international recognition of the right
to armed resistance.”61 In effect, this is an extension of the
principle of self-defence that legitimized the use of force
by states against non-state actors, subject to the underly-
ing causes of the conflict.62
In Canada, the Geneva Conventions Act directly imple-
ments our treaty commitments,63 and the government has
been an advocate of the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples at the United Nations.64 Acts of
violence, no matter how deserving the ultimate goal, un-
derscore the philosophical conundrum of means versus
ends and whether it can ever be ethical to sanction death
and destruction in support of a just cause. It is difficult, if
not deeply problematic from a moral perspective, to jus-
tify the deliberate killing of an unarmed population, re-
gardless of the cause or purpose. In this regard, interna-
tional humanitarian law does not seek to justify or ration-
alize violence, but rather to assert a comprehensive set of
rules that apply to all actors in a conflict—and to promote
the prosecution of those who violate the rules clearly and
consistently. Thus a claim to “combatant status” does not
immunize all acts of violence, but it has a significant im-
pact on the characterization of particular actors and of-
fences. In the context of wars of liberation or independ-
ence being waged by groups with a recognized right to self-
determination, the use of force against military targets or
police units empowered to conduct “public order” missions
is permitted. When civilians are targeted in attacks by such
groups, those acts are subject to sanction as violations of
humanitarian law, with recourse to a set of well-established
defences. Thus illicit acts of war perpetrated by or on behalf
of “peoples” struggling for their rights to self-determination,
are a separable phenomenon distinct from individual, spo-
radic acts of violence in peacetime. As Cassese points out
in his study of the Achille Lauro hijacking, “the activities of
national liberation movements per se cannot be equated
with terrorism . . . just because these movements are com-
prised of irregular combatants fighting against govern-
ments, this does not mean they should be seen by the in-
ternational community as criminal organizations.”65 In
cases where illicit acts are systematic and widespread,
Cassese suggests that a state may legitimately consider the
armed nucleus or faction of a movement as a criminal or-
ganization. However, “ . . . such an . . . assessment does not
necessarily involve the whole movement, so long as the lat-
ter pursues legitimate political objectives . . . ”66 An in-depth
exegesis on international humanitarian law is beyond the
scope of this paper, but it should be clear from the forego-
ing summary that in assessing the means or method of vio-
lence employed by states and non-state actors alike, an
understanding of the context is essential. Certain acts that
are impermissible in peacetime are permitted in war.
Article 21 of the new treaty on the financing of “terror-
ism” explicitly acknowledges the interplay between its own
mandate and international humanitarian law: “Nothing in
this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States and individuals under interna-
tional law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations, international humanitarian law and other
relevant conventions.”67 Thus full compliance with the
treaty would explicitly require its provisions to be inter-
preted in light of international humanitarian law. Shortly
before the treaty opened for signature in January 2000,
Canada indicated its intention to sign and ratify it.68 The
treaty is especially relevant to the Canadian context, be-
cause a majority of the refugees and other non-citizens con-
sidered security risks under the Immigration Act are not
people who have ever engaged in violent activity themselves,
but are associated with Canadian organizations that csis
has identified as “fronts” for fundraising in support of
“homeland conflicts.”69 Before ratifying the treaty, the gov-
ernment will need to review whether existing Criminal
Code offences address the requirements of the Treaty, for
it imposes an obligation on states to establish as criminal
offences the specific offences enumerated in the other ter-
rorist conventions,70 as well as,
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily in-
jury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimi-
date a population, or to compel a government or an interna-
tional organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.71
Arguably domestic law concerning conspiracy, common
intention, and aiding or abetting unlawful acts already ad-
dresses the situation of people who contribute material
support to the commission of illegal acts. While any indi-
vidual in Canada could be subject to criminal prosecution
on these grounds, in practice, prosecutions are never initi-
ated against refugees whom the government finds to be
engaged in financing “terrorism.” The fact that these refu-
gees have not engaged in any unlawful activities (either in
Canada or their country of origin) must be at least a par-
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tial explanation for the absence of such prosecutions.72 It
should be noted that the un treaty itself criminalizes “ter-
rorist” fundraising only to the extent that funds are col-
lected “wilfully . . . with the intention that they should be
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or
in part, in order to carry out . . . ” the specified offences or
acts.73 Additional provisions indicate that it is also an of-
fence to participate as an accomplice, organize or direct
others to commit an offence, or intentionally “contribute
to the commission of an offence by a group of persons act-
ing with a common purpose.”74 The Treaty is a clear affir-
mation that those who financially contribute to violent acts
are to be considered just as culpable as those who detonate
the bombs.
However, the Treaty’s provisions clearly articulate the
legal requirement of mens rea. Individuals will be found
complicit in the commission of an offence only when they
knew or ought to have known that their activities were sup-
porting the crime. The requirement of this mental element
is consistent with the standards widely applied in both
criminal and refugee law75 and necessarily implies that mere
membership or affiliation with groups responsible for in-
ternational crimes would not be sufficient to establish an
offence under the treaty.
It is also important to note that the treaty incorporates
an express limitation on the duty to extradited offenders
who will be subjected to discriminatory applications of the
criminal law authority:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing
an obligation to extradite . . . if the requested State Party has
substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradi-
tion . . . has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or pun-
ishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, na-
tionality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compli-
ance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s
position for any of these reasons.76
As Hathaway emphasizes, an individual does not face
genuine criminal prosecution where discrimination results
in selective prosecution, denial of procedural or adjucative
fairness, or differential punishment.77
The Treaty further stipulates that its measures must be
implemented through the mechanism of domestic crimi-
nal law. In the Canadian context, the necessary result would
be that anyone alleged to have been involved in financing
“terrorism” will be afforded all the safeguards of the crimi-
nal justice system, including constitutionally protected
rights to counsel, to know and meet and the state’s case,
and most importantly, the benefit of the criminal law stand-
ard of proof—not to be convicted unless guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt. From a human rights perspec-
tive, it would be a significant advance if the Canadian gov-
ernment proceeded to implement the Convention and
prosecute alleged offenders. Such action would be viewed
as positive, however, only if the government resorted to the
criminal law for citizens and non-citizens alike—repudi-
ating the current practice of invoking security certificate
and deportation proceedings (with none of the safeguards
already mentioned) for refugees and other non-citizens.
In the meantime, deportation continues to be the preferred
recourse for addressing alleged refugee “terrorists,” and so
a more thorough examination of the applicable immigra-
tion laws and their historical evolution follows.
Canadian Immigration Law and National Security
Canada’s historical record clearly reflects the extent to which
each new influx of immigrants engendered reactions that
sought to criminalize foreigners and thwart others from
gaining admission in the first place. As Stasiulus and Yuval-
Davis observe, immigration laws have been used in settler
societies to encourage “desirable” immigrants to settle in
the country and to exclude “undesirable” ones.78 In this re-
gard, post-Confederation immigration law and policy in
Canada share a trajectory with other colonial states. While
seeking to promote immigration as an strategy essential
for industrial growth, the newly formed Confederation was
equally concerned about controlling entry and safeguard-
ing the developing nation from individuals thought unde-
sirable because of their “race” or nationality, as well as for
economic, medical, criminal, or security reasons. Canada’s
first Act Respecting Immigration and Immigrants, passed
in 1869, was designed primarily to ensure the safety and
protection of British immigrants travelling to Canada. As
early as 1872, there was a prohibition against immigrants
who might be a security risk. That year an amendment to
the Immigration Act provided that “The Governor in Coun-
cil may, by proclamation, whenever he deems it necessary,
prohibit the landing in Canada of any criminal, or other
vicious class of immigrants, to be designated by such proc-
lamation.”79 Section 41 of the Immigration Act of 1910 added
to the prohibited classes “any person other than a Canadian
citizen [who] advocates in Canada the overthrow by force
or violence of the Government of Great Britain or Canada,
or other British Dominion, Colony, possession or depend-
ency, or the overthrow by force or violence of constitutional
law or authority.”80 A privative clause in the Immigration
Act denied the right of appeal to anyone who was refused
admission or ordered deported pursuant to the Act.81
 In the wake of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the “Red
Scare” in the West, as well as increasing labour unrest in
Canada, the scope of Section 41 was widened to include
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anyone who “advocates or teaches the unlawful destruc-
tion of property” and anyone who “is a member of or af-
filiated with any organization entertaining or teaching the
disbelief in organized government.” The government used
this statutory authority to bar entry or deport hundreds of
“anarchists and revolutionaries,” who were primarily sus-
pected communists and union organizers.82 This amend-
ment gave the government the right to deport anyone who
was deemed a member of one the inadmissible classes, for
up to five years after arrival in Canada. By 1923 all immi-
grants were required to have visas, and procedures for the
examination of visa applicants began to develop. During
the inter-war period as well as World War ii, the Immigra-
tion Act continued to provide government officers with
broad discretionary powers to exclude individuals, includ-
ing “enemy aliens,” on the grounds of national security.
Following World War ii, the Canadian government
sought to expand the immigration program in an effort to
meet labour market demands as well as to contribute to
the relief of displaced persons in Europe. In recognition of
the security problem posed by the surge in immigration,
the rcmp was dispatched to London to join the immigra-
tion vetting team. In the immediate post-war period, fear
of Soviet infiltration (not Nazi collaborators) was the pri-
mary security concern. This concern became heightened
when a clerk from the Soviet Embassy named Gouzenko
defected and revealed the existence of a communist spy
network. The “Gouzenko affair” generated a widespread
preoccupation within government about security—a con-
cern that grew as Cold War tensions increased. Immigra-
tion regulations continued the absolute prohibition on ad-
mission of communists, while Cabinet directives author-
ized a selective course of immigration security screening
without deciding whom to screen, how to screen, or what
screening criteria would be applied. These decisions were
left to the discretion of the rcmp. Records indicate that
Cabinet regarded security matters as a key priority but did
not want the security process made public. As reported in
a recent Federal Court decision,“[n]ot only was the actual
process secret but the fact that such a process was in place
was a closely guarded secret.”83
In 1952 a new Immigration Act was implemented, gov-
erning Canadian immigration procedures for the follow-
ing twenty-five years. Section 5 of the Act listed the classes
of persons who were prohibited from admission to Canada,
while Section 19 provided the authority to deport those
already in Canada on security grounds.84 According to the
Act, individuals were considered security risks who are, have
been, or are likely to become “members of or associated
with any organization, group or body of any kind concern-
ing which there are reasonable grounds for believing that
it promotes or advocates . . . subversion by force or other
means.”85 Other subsections of the Act specifically addressed
related security risks, including espionage, sabotage, and
treason. The Immigration Appeal Board Act of 1967 im-
plemented a right of appeal for people facing deportation
but also set out the conditions for overriding appeal pro-
cedures in serious security cases.86 From its early roots
through to the 1960s, the explicit objective of immigration
law and policy was to sustain the British character of
Canada and exclude those who were thought incapable of
contributing to the government’s assimilationist project of
nation building. The driving force behind measures of na-
tional security and immigration control during this period
was the Anglo-Saxon fear that the influx of foreigners threat-
ened the nation’s “racial purity” and/or political fabric.87
Canada became a party to the 1951 United Nations Con-
vention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
in 1969. The Convention carved out an explicit exception
to the notion that states had the absolute prerogative to
decide whom to admit to their territories.88 Qualified refu-
gees would no longer be seeking a privilege, but be assert-
ing a right that statutory states would be obliged to con-
sider. Despite the idealism and neutral language embed-
ded in the Convention, ideological considerations fre-
quently informed Canada’s response to international refu-
gee crises, particularly in the early years of the Cold War.
The refuge provided to people fleeing communist regimes
in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Vietnam
in 1979, while the relatively closed door offered to Chilean
refugees fleeing Pinochet’s coup in 1973, are striking mani-
festations of this tendency.89
In response to a government green paper recommend-
ing that immigration legislation should embody a more
positive approach, a new Immigration Act was imple-
mented in 1978.90 This legislation, amended several times
over the past twenty-two years, is still in force. For the first
time, the objectives of Canada’s immigration policy were
explicitly spelled out. These included attainment of Cana-
da’s demographic goals, promotion of family reunification,
and development of a strong economy. The Act included
among its purposes the imposition of standards of admis-
sion that do not discriminate on grounds of race, national,
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, or sex; the fulfilment of
Canada’s international legal obligations to refugees and
upholding its humanitarian tradition towards the displaced
and the persecuted; the maintenance and protection of the
health, safety, and good order of Canadian society, and pro-
motion of international order and justice by denying the
use of Canadian territory to persons who are likely to en-
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gage in criminal activity.91 The Act incorporated the essen-
tial parts of the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee and
its “exclusion clauses.” Protection would be afforded to per-
sons with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particu-
lar social group or political opinion. Status would be de-
nied to those not deserving protection, including the per-
petrators of war crimes, serious non-political crimes, and
acts “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.” The Act also incorporated the principle of non-
refoulement, the positive commitment not to remove refu-
gees to a country where their life or freedom would be
threatened for any of the Convention reasons. Exceptions,
consistent with the Refugee Convention, were stipulated
for persons who constituted a danger to “the security of
Canada” or public safety.92 In 1977 United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) had cautioned that
as exceptions to an important protection principle, the se-
curity and public order provisions should be interpreted
and implemented restrictively.93 Neither the Act nor sub-
sequent regulations referred to the meaning of “security of
Canada”94 or the unhcr’s caution.
Section 19 (1) of the Act established a somewhat refined
list of classes of people who were inadmissible to Canada
for security reasons: persons who there are “reasonable
grounds to believe” have engaged or will engage in espio-
nage, subversion against democratic government, and sub-
version by force of any government.95 In addition, persons
were inadmissible where “there are reasonable grounds to
believe [they] will engage in acts of violence that would or
might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada or
are members of or likely to participate in the unlawful ac-
tivities of an organization that is likely to engage in such
acts of violence.”96 Finally, there was a provision to exclude
persons who had committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity.97 The Act explicitly referred to the Criminal Code
for the purposes of defining war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and the Code’s definitions of “public order of-
fences” would clearly be relevant to the interpretation of
espionage. However, nothing in the new Act, regulations,
or administrative policy provided any criteria or guidance
for what constituted “membership” or “subversion.” Over
the next decade, Canada opened its doors to thousands of
refugees from non-traditional source countries. However,
Canada’s record of compliance with international human
rights standards and the Refugee Convention in particular
continued to be uneven.98
In the wake of concerns about the conduct of the Secu-
rity Service of the rcmp in the 1970s, the government es-
tablished the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain
Activities of the rcmp commonly referred to by the name
of its chair, Mr. Justice D.C. McDonald. In 1981 the
McDonald Commission released its second report, Free-
dom and Security under the Law.99 The Commission found
that the rcmp had subjected many groups, including the
“new left,” Quebec separatists, unions, the Indian move-
ment, and others to surveillance, infiltration, and “dirty
tricks,” solely on the grounds that they were exercising their
freedom of expression through lawful advocacy, protest,
and dissent. A full chapter of the Commission’s report ad-
dressed immigration security screening. The Commission
found that the statutory security criteria set out in the Im-
migration Act were “too broad” and were inconsistent with
the definition of “threats to the security of Canada,” which
the Commission proposed should inform all security-re-
lated screening activities.110 The Commission observed,
Canada must meet both the requirements of security and the
requirements of democracy: we must never forget that the
fundamental purpose of the former is to secure the latter . . .
In taking the position that the requirements of security in
Canada must be reconciled with the requirements of democ-
racy, let us be clear that we regard responsible government,
the rule of law and the right to dissent as among the essential
requirements of our system of democracy.101
Although the Commission recommended including po-
litical violence and “terrorism” within the admissibility pro-
visions of the Immigration Act, it underscored the impor-
tance of distinguishing between international groups se-
cretly pursuing in Canada their terrorist objectives against
foreign governments, from representatives of foreign lib-
eration or dissident groups who come to Canada to pro-
mote their cause openly.102 Based on the Commission’s find-
ings, Parliament endorsed the establishment of a new se-
curity intelligence agency, outside of the rcmp, with a man-
date to investigate and advise but without prosecutorial or
enforcement powers. In 1984 the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Service Act was adopted, and the service was cre-
ated to, among other things, provide government depart-
ments and agencies with security assessments on prospec-
tive immigrants. Section 2 of the csis Act defines “threats
to the security of Canada” as being (1) espionage or sabo-
tage; (2) foreign-influenced activities within or in relation
to Canada that are detrimental to its interests and are clan-
destine or deceptive and involve a threat to any person; (3)
activities within or relating to Canada, directed toward or
in support of the threat or use of serious violence against
persons or property for the purpose of achieving a politi-
cal objective within Canada or a foreign state; and (4) ac-
tivities directed against undermining by covert unlawful
acts—or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to
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the destruction or overthrow by violence of—the consti-
tutionally established system of government in Canada. The
statutory language in Section 2 is very broad and has been
the subject of criticism for this reason. As Gorlick notes,
statutory terms such as clandestine or deceptive and foreign
influenced are not defined in the Act, and “inevitably the
interpretation of such terms will fall to the agency that has
the most to gain from statutory power, that is, csis itself.”103
An important safeguard, however, is the inclusion at the
end of Section 2 of the specific qualification that a threat
to the security of Canada “does not include lawful advo-
cacy, protest or dissent unless carried in conjunction with
any of the activities referred to above.”104
Parliament failed to implement the McDonald Commis-
sion’s proposals on revising the Immigration Act. The re-
sult is that the definition used by csis officers to investi-
gate and provide advice to ministers on security risks that
may be posed by prospective immigrants continues to be
inconsistent with the admissibility provisions of the Im-
migration Act. Whereas the term threat in the csis Act is
specifically defined in terms of enumerated activities rather
than associations, the Immigration Act maintained its use
of broad admissibility categories. Over the next decade
many of the criticisms surfaced that had been levelled
against the rcmp, and now were directed at the new secu-
rity intelligence agency and the practices and conduct of
its officers.105 Complaints have been made to the Security
Intelligence Review Committee (sirc), the agency “watch-
dog” for csis, documenting the extent to which the service
has crossed the line and is engaging not just in monitoring
threats to the security of Canada, but, like the rcmp before
when dealing with “subversives,” is intruding into the lives
and futures of those involved in legitimate forms of ex-
pression and dissent.106 Reporting on investigations span-
ning several years, sirc found instances in which csis in-
structions that sources report on only “authorized subjects
of an investigation” had not been fully implemented.107 Also
noted was “an occasional lack of rigour in the Service’s
application of existing policies, which oblige it to weigh
the requirement to protect civil liberties against the need
to investigate potential threats.”108 Media reports have ex-
posed how, in some cases, refugees have been overtly or
implicitly induced to become informers on fellow com-
munity members—with promises of prompt resolution of
their own residence applications.109 All prospective immi-
grants, including refugees, are under a certain compulsion
to cooperate with csis officers, as a positive recommenda-
tion from the Service is a condition for obtaining perma-
nent residence status and citizenship.
Canada signed the 1984 Convention Against Torture
(cat) in 1985 without any reservation and ratified it in 1987,
after extensive consultations with provincial and territo-
rial governments.110 Article 3 of the cat imposes an abso-
lute, non-derogable obligation on states not to return any-
one to a country where she or he is at risk of torture, effec-
tively superseding the security exception in the Refugee
Convention.111 Although the government was an increas-
ingly vocal proponent of human rights standards and in-
stitutions in international and regional fora, no steps were
taken to incorporate the obligations assumed under Arti-
cle 3 of the cat into domestic immigration law.112 In the
same period, the government was setting up the Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board that would provide refugee claim-
ants with an oral hearing. A Supreme Court decision in-
terpreting the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms held
that existing administrative procedures for determining
refugee status inside Canada failed to meet the procedural
guarantees of fundamental justice.113
In 1992, as Cold-War security considerations had given
way to an increasing preoccupation with deterring “illegal
migration” from the South, the Canadian government in-
troduced a series of restrictive amendments to the Immi-
gration Act. Bill c-86 made changes to the overall structure
of existing immigration security procedures and enumer-
ated a set of specific objectives for the scheme under the
heading “Safety and Security of Canada.” Section 38.1 of
the amended Act articulated the purposes of the security
procedures:
Recognizing that persons who are not Canadian citizens or
permanent residents have no right to come into or remain in
Canada and that permanent residents have only a qualified
right to do so, and recognizing the necessity of cooperation
with foreign governments and agencies in maintaining na-
tional security, the purposes of sections 39 to 40.2 are
(a) to enable the Government of Canada to fulfil its duty to
remove persons who constitute a threat to the security or
interests of Canada or whose presence endangers the lives
or safety of persons in Canada;
(b) to ensure the protection of sensitive security and crimi-
nal intelligence information; and
(c) to provide a process for the expeditious removal of per-
sons found to be members of an inadmissible class re-
ferred to in section 39 or 40.1.114
Bill c-86 introduced a new form of criminality into the
Act, provisions to render refugees and immigrants “inad-
missible” where there are reasonable grounds to believe they
will “engage in terrorism”115 or are “members of an organi-
zation that there are reasonable grounds to believe will . . .
engage in terrorism.”116 An additional subsection provided
that persons are inadmissible if they have engaged in “ter-
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rorism,” or are “members of an organization that was en-
gaged in terrorism,” unless they can satisfy the Minister that
their admission would not be detrimental to the national
interest.117 According to former Solicitor General Doug
Lewis, these clauses were designed to ensure that Canada
does not become a safe haven for retired or active terror-
ists.118 The subsections dealing with espionage and subver-
sion were broadened to include within their ambit past or
present membership in organizations that have engaged in
these acts in the past, are engaging in them now, or will
engage in them in the future.119 The package of amendments
also introduced “access criteria” into the Act, requiring all
refugee claimants to undergo an eligibility determination
pursuant to an enumerated list of disqualifications that
were based, among other things, on the new security ad-
missibility criteria. In cases where the Minister found it
“contrary to the public interest,” claimants would be di-
vested of the right to pursue their refugee claim.120 Subject
to a further ministerial opinion that they constituted a “dan-
ger to the security of Canada,” Convention refugees as well
as those deemed ineligible to claim refugee status were to
be deported back to the very countries from which they
fled and where their lives or freedom would be threatened.121
In defence of the legislative amendments, it was suggested
that the former Immigration Act “put the safety and secu-
rity of Canadians at risk . . . [and] we have to face the fact
that the world of the 1990’s is a world of increasingly sophis-
ticated, internationally organized criminals and terrorists.”122
Once the amendments contained in Bill c-86 were im-
plemented, immigration officers had an expanded basis to
support determinations of inadmissibility. With the new
provisions on “terrorism,” the Immigration Act delegated
the job of identifying possible terrorists to csis while re-
taining for its own department the ultimate authority to
decide who will be excluded from Canada on the basis of
possible links to “terrorism.” Certain refugee communities
found themselves increasingly subject to surveillance by
csis. Long delays associated with security clearance proce-
dures meant that some individuals could expect to wait
years before being able to sponsor family members, enrol
in post-secondary education, start a business, or travel out-
side the country. Complaints lodged with sirc about these
delays or the nature of advice provided by the Service failed
to resolve the problems. In three recent Kurdish cases, sirc
Chairman Robert Rae concluded that adverse assessments
provided by csis were based on inaccurate assumptions.
Despite the extensive investigations and hearings that sup-
ported sirc’s conclusions in these cases, the Service re-
sponded by preparing “updated assessments” in defence of
its original advice, a move that has been interpreted as an
attempt to overrule and effectively discredit the commit-
tee.123 The absence of definition or discriminate content for
the terms terrorism, membership in a terrorist organization
and security of Canada, permits the Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration unfettered discretion to issue secu-
rity certificates. Unlike the procedures set up in the United
Kingdom, where there are statutory definitions and the
designation by the executive of which groups and organi-
zations meet the definition, is subject to approval by both
Houses of Parliament and even appeal,124 there are no pub-
lic procedures to deal with the designation of terrorist or-
ganizations.
By the 1990s there was an emerging consensus among
scholars and legal experts that both the principle of non-
refoulement and the prohibition against torture had become
rules of customary international law, and further, peremp-
tory norms of jus cogens.125 In the extradition context, two
Supreme Court rulings confirmed that fundamental jus-
tice should prevent Canada from surrendering a fugitive
to a foreign state in circumstances where they would be
subjected to torture.126 In the same spirit, in 1996 Canadian
government representatives in Geneva joined in the con-
sensus for the 1996 Conclusion of the unhcr’s Executive
Committee in reaffirming “the fundamental principle of
non-refoulement, which prohibits the expulsion and return
of persons in respect of whom there are grounds for be-
lieving that they would be in danger of being subjected to
torture, as set forth in the Convention against Torture.”127
Yet within the next two years the government executed de-
portation orders in direct contravention of requests by the
United Nations Committee against Torture and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.128 Domestically,
the government was maintaining its firm commitment to
its “right” to deport criminals129 and “security risks,” regard-
less of the human rights at issue.130 Although a United Na-
tions resolution urges states to ensure that refugee status is
“not used for the purpose of preparing or organizing ter-
rorist acts,”131 international institutions firmly support an
absolute prohibition against deporting anyone to a county
where there is risk of torture.132 Removal is also proscribed
to a country where fair trial guarantees are absent, the death
penalty will be imposed (albeit with considerable varia-
tion in state practice in this regard)133 or, with some bal-
ancing of interests, in cases that result in statelessness,134
and family separation, particularly where children are in-
volved.135
Meanwhile, over the past several years, there have been
repeated calls from some quarters for Canada to restrict
access to its refugee program and an increasing public per-
ception that Canada’s “porous” borders are endangering
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Canadians.136 In response to such concerns, the federal gov-
ernment commissioned a series of studies and consulta-
tions,137 and most recently proposed a number of wide-
ranging reforms to the Immigration Act. Although Bill c-
31, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, will not
be implemented because of the recent federal election, it
provides a good indication of future policy directions. As
for national security issues, the bill maintained the provi-
sions related to “membership” and “terrorism,” with no
definition or statutory criteria for either term. There was
provision for discretionary relief in circumstances where
the minister was “satisfied that the admission would not
be detrimental to the national interest.”138 The bill failed to
address repeated recommendations that the definition of
security threat in the Act be harmonized with the defini-
tion in the csis Act.139 In addition to proposing broader
grounds for security inadmissibility, the bill proposed to
treat permanent residents and other non-citizens in the
same manner under a new category as “foreign nationals.”
Currently, permanent residents faced with security proceed-
ings have automatic access to sirc, which examines the basis
of the security opinion and provides an important check
on the authority of csis. Sirc counsel have an opportunity
to question witnesses who have been permitted to testify
ex parte and in effect represent the interests of the person
concerned. A summary of such evidence, subject to secu-
rity “expurgation,” is provided. It is only after the hearing
is completed that sirc issues a recommendation to the Gov-
ernor in Council on whether a certificate should be issued.140
In proceedings involving non-permanent residents, on the
other hand, the certificate has already been issued and the
task of a “designated judge” (one of a small number of Fed-
eral Court judges who have received special clearance to
review security cases) is to determine whether it should be
quashed. The government’s case is presented primarily in
secret and in the absence of the person concerned. In most
cases, the csis officers who actually conducted the inter-
views and tendered the adverse security recommendation
are not made available for questioning. The court has no
independent counsel to assist, nor are there any special rules
governing the unique features of such hearings.141 Bill c-31
proposed the lower standard of procedural justice for all
foreign nationals by stripping sirc of its current responsi-
bility for permanent residents. Both refugees and perma-
nent residents were to be accorded only an “informal and
expeditious” Federal Court review of ministerial security
opinions, with no possibility of further review or appeal. It
deserves mention that ten years ago, a parliamentary re-
view of the csis Act recommended that the Immigration
Act be amended to allow any person subject to an adverse
security report to have the case investigated by sirc, with
direct recourse to an administrative hearing.142 The latest
legislative initiative not only failed to address the existing
shortcoming in the Act, but was proposing to further erode
an essential safeguard. Although the bill contained new ref-
erences to the cat, the explicit exemption authorizing the
Minister to deport people regardless of the risks they might
face, remained in place for designated security cases.143
The overhaul of the Immigration Act in 1978, implemen-
tation in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, as well as the emergence of new international
standards, generated considerable optimism about the
prospects for a meaningful amelioration of conditions for
immigrants and refugees as historically disadvantaged
groups in Canadian society. Recourse to “Charter chal-
lenges” would offer an important mechanism of account-
ability, with the courts providing aggrieved individuals di-
rect access to public decisions affecting their lives and an
opportunity to challenge laws independent of government
law reform agendas.144Despite these lofty hopes, the fore-
going review of the national security/admissibility provi-
sions in Canadian immigration law discloses little evidence
of progress. The individuals and groups subject to security
targeting may have changed, but the measures proposed in
2000 bear remarkable similarity to historical forms of ex-
clusion. The enforcement of the seemingly neutral admis-
sibility provisions and their attendant procedures leave wide
scope for unprincipled and discriminatory decision with
virtually no appeal mechanism and limited procedural
rights. Resort to the courts has not addressed the inequi-
ties in the system but instead has frequently reinforced
them.
The second part of this paper will include a closer look
at Federal Court jurisprudence concerning refugees and
other non-citizens alleged to be “terrorists” or members of
“terrorist” organizations.
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